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REVIEW ESSAY

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

John Marshall:Definer of a Nation. By Jean Edward Smith. Henry
Holt. 1996. Pp. 736. $35.00 and The Great Chief Justice: John
Marshalland the Rule of Law. By Charles F. Hobson. University
of Kansas Press. 1996. Pp. 256. $35.00.
SAMUEL R. OLKEN*

INTRODUCTION
In the pantheon of American constitutional law, John Marshall occupies a special place of honor. Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court from 1801 until his death in 1835, Marshall
presided over the Court's transformation from a neglected part of
the federal government into a powerful tribunal of constitutional
interpretation. Uncertain and often fragmented in its initial decade,' the Court under Marshall's energetic and charismatic leadership, emerged as the principal guardian of the Constitution, a
bulwark for individual rights2 and the ultimate arbiter of legal

* A.B., Harvard College, 1982, J.D. Emory University, 1985. Assistant
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
1. Between 1789 and 1801, the Supreme Court decided 63 cases. The
Court met for one month a year, as the justices spent several months hearing
federal cases on circuit. Frequent changes in personnel and the justices'
practice of delivering seriatim,or individual opinions, underscored the Court's
relatively weak institutional identity. Moreover, it heard few cases of significant constitutional importance. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL:
DEFINER OF A NATION 282-84 (1996). But cf DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 3-58

(1985) (arguing that during its first decade the Court set forth the antecedents of modern judicial review and constitutional construction).
2. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166, 170 (1803);
cf Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (refusing to apply the Bill
of Rights to the states).
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conflicts within the federal system. Over the course of three and a
half decades, the Marshall Court delineated the limits of government in a democratic republic and, in so doing, bolstered the prestige of the federal judiciary while preserving the delicate balance
between state and federal authority. Constitutional supremacy,
judicial independence and dedication to the rule of law characterized the philosophy of the Court during this era.
Often unanimous in its major constitutional opinions, the
Court, in the words of Marshall biographer Jean Edward Smith,
set out to "define the nation" through its interpretation of the Constitution.4 Most of the time the Court spoke through its eminent
Chief Justice, whose views significantly shaped the development of
constitutional law and the role of the Supreme Court. John Marshall regarded the Constitution as the fundamental law of a nation
in which the people retained ultimate political control in a federal
system that allocated authority between the states and the federal
government. Accordingly, Marshall understood the Constitution
as a document that reflected the will of the people to protect individual liberty through limitations upon both the state and federal
governments. For Marshall, the supremacy of the Constitution,.
therefore, derived from its popular origins and, as he explained in
Marbury v. Madison' and McCulloch v. Maryland,"it was popular
sovereignty that compelled the Supreme Court to invalidate federal and state laws that conflicted with the Constitution. Consequently, the Marshall Court employed judicial review to preserve
separation of powers on the national level and to prevent the
"centrifugal forces" of the states from destroying the country in its
early years.
Although the fourth person to hold the position of Chief Justice,' Marshall was undoubtedly the first to appreciate the singular
role of the Court in the country's constitutional system. As a legal
3. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
4. SMITH, supra note 1, at 1-2.
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-406 (1819).
7. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE RULE OF LAW 21, 123, 210-11 (1996). See also SMITH, supra note 1, at

445.
8. Confirmed as Chief Justice on January 27, 1801, Marshall succeeded
Oliver Ellsworth, who resigned because of illness in December, 1800. Originally, President Adams sought to reappoint John Jay as Chief Justice, but
Jay, who presided over the Court as its first Chief Justice from 1789 until
1795, when he left to practice law and enter New York politics, declined Adams's offer, believing the Court lacked sufficient prestige and authority. Marshall's only other predecessor as Chief Justice, John Rutledge, from South
Carolina, was on the Court for a single term but left when he failed to receive
Senate confirmation. Interestingly, Marshall himself declined appointment to
the Court as an Associate Justice in 1798.
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institution and not a political one, the Court, from Marshall's perspective, enjoyed a particular distinction in the American constitutional framework that necessitated its independence and
prompted its conservatism in the wake of political expediency.
While Marshall recognized that the coordinate branches of the federal government and the state courts themselves could review the
constitutionality of governmental actions,9 he believed the Supreme Court had the solemn duty of preserving the Constitution
and its inherent values from the ephemeral whims of transient
democratic majorities and the political factions which controlled
them.'0 As a tribunal of last resort in matters concerning federal
law, treaties and the Constitution itself, the Court alone had the
authority to decide cases from which there could be no appeal."
Marshall and his brethren maintained the independence of
the federal judiciary during an era of intense political turmoil.
Buffeted initially by threats of impeachment from radical Jeffersonian Republicans, 2 later criticized vociferously by states' rights
advocates," and eventually drawn into the wrenching turmoil of
9. See HOBSON, supra note 7, at 67. Marshall's "defense of judicial review
fully agreed with the 'departmental theory' of constitutional interpretation,
according to which each of the three coordinate departments of government
had the final authority to interpret the Constitution when acting within its
own sphere of duties and responsibilities." Id. However, the Supreme Court,
under Article III of the Constitution, retained the ultimate authority to make
sure that the coordinate branches of the federal government, as well as the
states, acted within the parameters of the Constitution. See, e.g., Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (sustaining the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions involving issues of constitutional
law, federal law or treaties); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816) (Story, J.) (reversing a Virginia appellate court decision that conflicted with a United States treaty with Great Britain); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 (6
Cranch) U.S. 87 (1810) (invalidating, under the Contract Clause, a Georgia
law that rescinded land grants); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803) (holding unconstitutional a federal law that altered the Court's original
jurisdiction).
10. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810). See
also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 194-99

(1990) (discussing the Marshall Court, judicial review, private property and
political factions).
1L See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)
(Story, J.). For discussion of Marshall's views see Samuel R. Olken, John
Marshall and Spencer Roane: An Historical Analysis of their Conflict over
U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Court Jurisdiction, 1990 J.S. CT. HIST. 125
[hereinafter Olken, John Marshall and Spencer Roane].
12. This occurred during the infamous impeachment of Associate Justice
Samuel Chase in 1805. For an excellent overview see RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 69-82
(1971) (discussing the impeachments of New Hampshire Federalist judge

John Pickering and Chase).
13. See, e.g., Olken, John Marshall and Spencer Roane, supra note 11
(discussing the states' rights controversy over the Supreme Court's appellate
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Indian affairs" and indirectly into the slavery crisis during the
1820s and 1830s,' 5 the Court refrained from political partisanship
and claimed for itself the province of legal adjudication. 16 Two recently published books, Jean Edward Smith's John Marshall:Definer of a Nation and Charles F. Hobson's The Great Chief Justice:
John Marshall and the Rule of Law, examine the life and juris-

prudence of America's most important jurist. Both are superb
works of historical scholarship which contribute significantly, albeit in different ways, to understanding John Marshall as a historical figure and the challenges faced by the Supreme Court during the first decades of the nineteenth century.
While many books and articles have analyzed the tenure of
John Marshall as Chief Justice, relatively few biographies have
been written about him." Born in 1755 on the Virginia frontier,
Marshall's active and varied life encompassed the critical formative years of the nation. A veteran of the American Revolution, he
practiced law, served in his state legislature and rose to prominence in both Congress and as Secretary of State before he became
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court at the age of
forty-five. As a historical figure, Marshall's significance is comparable to that of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, or James
Madison, each of whom was involved with Marshall in the public
affairs of the early republic and has been the subject of many biographies over the years. Unlike his renowned contemporaries,
jurisdiction from 1810-21).
14. See, e.g., HOBSON, supra note 7, at 170-80 (discussing the political and
legal context of the Marshall Court's leading Indian cases); SMITH, supra note
1, at 515-18 (similar discussion).

15. See HOBSON, supra note 7, at 163-70 (discussing Marshall's legal and
constitutional views of slavery); SMITH, supra note 1, at 453-55 (discussing
states' rights, slavery and the controversy in Virginia over federal judicial
power). Smith explains ambiguously that "[tihe issue of slavery itself never
came before the Marshall Court." Id. at 488. However, the Court addressed
some aspects of slavery and the slave trade in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66 (1825). In this case, the Court, though troubled by the moral issues arising from slavery, ruled that the United States must observe international law and return a slave ship to its Latin American origins. Id.
16. See generally HOBSON, supra note 7, at 47-214 (discussing the distinction between law and politics in Marshall's jurisprudence); SMITH, supra note
1, at 282-524 (discussing Marshall's Court years).
17. Previous biographies include: LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A
LIFE IN LAW; ALBERT BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (4 vols.)
(1916); FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1981). See also Joseph Story, A discourse upon the Life, Character,
and Services of the Honorable John Marshall in 3 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE,
CHARACTER, AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 327 (John F. Dillon, ed., 1903); JAMES B.
THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1901); and G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 7-34 (Oxford

paper. ed., 1978) (discussing Marshall). Marshall himself wrote an autobiography. See JOHN MARSHALL, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH (1833) (J.S.
Adams ed., 1937).
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Marshall destroyed most of his personal correspondence, leaving
scholars to sift through a vast array of his Court opinions, together
with records from his extensive public career and contemporary
newspaper accounts, in order to reconstruct his life. As a result,
most studies of Marshall focus upon his Court years, and many
perpetuate, in some form, the conventional notion of Marshall as a
judicial activist who imbued the Constitution with his political
views.18
Both Smith and Hobson challenge this perception of John
Marshall in fascinating books that draw upon previously scattered
primary sources carefully assembled by scholars at the Institute of
Early American Culture at the College of William and Mary.
Known collectively as the Marshall Papers, these documents include copies of letters Marshall wrote retained by the friends,
family and colleagues to whom he sent them, along with previously
neglected circuit court opinions and other materials that illuminate the interstices of Marshall's personal and public life and
permit reappraisal of his remarkable career. "
This review essay has three parts. The first discusses Marshall's life before he came onto the Supreme Court as presented by
Smith's biography. The second part addresses some of Smith's
points about the Marshall Court. The third and final section
briefly critiques the notion set forth by Charles Hobson in his book
about Marshall's jurisprudence that Marshall was a common law
jurist who sought to differentiate law from politics in his leading
constitutional decisions.
I.

MARSHALL'S RISE To THE BENCH

The Marshall who emerges in Smith's meticulous and wellwritten biography is a man of moderate politics whose reverence
for the Constitution and sincere faith in the national government
characterized his jurisprudence. Like Hobson, who incidentally is
the editor of the Marshall Papers, Smith, a professor of political
science at the University of Toronto, concludes that Marshall
sought to insulate the Court from the external pressure of partisan
politics. His is a tale of an urbane, sophisticated man endowed
with considerable legal ability, shrewd political instincts and impressive character who endured personal tragedy and public strife
with grace, compassion and even humor.
Smith devotes nearly three-fifths of his time to the years be18. See, e.g., 1 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY iv, 267-316

(1932) (discussing Marshall and nationalism); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED
A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

272-99 (4th ed. 1970). See BEVERIDGE, supra note 17, vols. 2-4, for this implication.
19. For an explanation of the Marshall Papers archival project see Charles
F. Hobson, John Marshalland His Papers,1996 J.S. CT. HIST. 30-35.
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fore Marshall came onto the Court. Rather than begin with John
Marshall's birth, Smith introduces Marshall at the outset of his
judicial career, poised to lead the Court while the Republicans under the leadership of newly elected President Thomas Jefferson
are about to assume control of the national government for the
first time from the Federalists. This was a critical period in the
nation's history: the Presidential and Congressional elections of
1800 underscored fundamental differences in political and constitutional theory extant since the Revolution, and never before had a
political transition of this magnitude occurred in the eleven years
since the Constitution's ratification."0 As Smith notes, it was imperative for the nation's survival that its highest court have at its
helm a person of sound political judgment and unimpeachable integrity intimately familiar with the Constitution and highly proficient in legal analysis.2 1 That Marshall was uniquely suited for
this task is the conclusion Smith ultimately draws over the course
of several hundred, closely reasoned pages. In this study of Marshall's life, Smith not only explains his subject's actions but dispels
much of the Marshallian mythology created by previous biographers such as Albert Beveridge, whose 1916 multi-volume work is
really more hagiography than detached historical scholarship.2
Early chapters of Smith's book describe Marshall's frontier
upbringing and family background. Descended from Welsh yeomanry through his father, Thomas, a land surveyor and speculator, and from the aristocratic Randolphs of eastern (Tidewater)
Virginia, through his mother, Mary, Marshall grew up the eldest of
fifteen children in the rough backwoods of colonial Virginia near
the Appalachian Mountains. Marshall apparently adored his father, who in Marshall's youth. was close friends with George
Washington and became a prominent surveyor for the colony's
largest landowner, Lord Fairfax. Active in politics and a soldier in
the Revolution, Thomas eventually acquired substantial tracts of
land in Kentucky. Although informally educated, he read widely
and encouraged his son, John, to do the same.
According to Smith, Marshall was hardly ill-educated for his
time. He read classical authors such as Horace and Livy, who influenced the future chief justice's literary style, along with Shake-

20. For a general overview of this period see ELLIS, supra note 12, at 27883 (discussing the Jeffersonian revolution); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 32-35 (Knopf
reprint. ed. 1962) (discussing Thomas Jefferson).
21. SMITH, supra note 1, at 279-81, 402.
22. See HOBSON, supra note 7, at 247 (alluding to Beveridge's mythological
treatment of Marshall and his overemphasis upon Marshall's nationalism);
SMITH, supra note 1, at 18 (attributing Beveridge's inaccurate analysis of the
Marshall-Jefferson relationship to the biographer's intense dislike for Jefferson).
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speare, Milton, Dryden and Alexander Pope.2' In addition, he
studied Latin and mathematics at a school in Washington County,
where he became lifelong friends with James Monroe, himself a
future statesman. Smith describes Marshall's early education in
some detail to refute the assertion of Beveridge and others that
Marshall was an unsophisticated youth whose mental agility only
manifested itself once he entered the practice of law and the realm
of politics.'
At twenty, Marshall began what would become nearly five
years of distinguished service in the American Revolution, to
which Smith attributes considerable importance in the formation
of Marshall's character and regards as illustrative of his innate
talent for leadership.2 ' Marshall, a Virginia rifleman, quickly
earned a promotion to officer and fought in battles at Great Bridge
(Virginia), Brandywine, Germantown (Pennsylvania) and Monmouth (New Jersey). He and fellow soldier James Monroe shared
a cabin in Valley Forge during the miserable winter of 1777-78,
where Marshall witnessed first hand the necessity for a strong national government to coordinate the war effort.' Instead, the weak
Continental Congress lacked the necessary authority to collect
badly needed revenue and supplies from individual states
throughout the war for independence. Marshall's military experience left an indelible impression and "confirmed his habit of considering America as his country and Congress as his government."27
At the conclusion of the Revolution, Marshall became a lawyer in his native Virginia, having attended, during a military furlough, George Wythe's lectures on common law at the College of
William and Mary. At William and Mary, Monroe was once again
a classmate, along with Marshall's future colleague and confidante
on the Supreme Court, Bushrod Washington, and Spencer Roane,
a formidable political rival and ascerbic critic of Marshall's over
thirty years later. Smith credits Wythe with introducing Marshall
to the common law methodology he eventually applied at the bar
and on the Court. 8 Wythe himself subscribed to the jurisprudence
23. SMITH, supra note 1, at 34-35.

24 See, e.g., I BEVERIDGE, supra note 17, at 42-46, 161. Beveridge acknowledges Marshall read Pope but discusses no other literary influences
upon him. See also HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at xiii
(criticizing Beveridge).
25. SMITH, supra note 1, at 37-69.
26. Years later, Marshall recounted this experience in his own book describing the life of George Washington. See II JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 406-65 (Ch. 11) (1801-06) (Citizens Guild reprint ed.

1926).
27. SMITH, supra note 1, at 69. See also MARSHALL, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH, supra note 17, at 9-10.
28. SMITH, supra note 1, at 76-79.
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of Blackstone, the eminent British jurist who emphasized deductive reasoning from general principles." Marshall also read works
by Montesquieu and Hume under Wythe's direction and thus
learned about separation of powers and the importance of property
rights for legal and social stability.0
Smith devotes considerable attention to Marshall's rise to
prominence as an attorney and politician in post-war Virginia, and
for good reason. Years later as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence reflected ideas
about law and government that he formed during this volatile period." Engaged in general practice, Marshall represented, among
others, both debtors and creditors in commercial law and observed with some trepidation the failure of the Virginia legislature
to protect property and contract rights from the capriciousness of
democratic majorities.3 Doubts about the efficiency of local legislative bodies and his conviction about the necessity for a strong
national government deepened in Marshall's mind throughout his
intermittent membership in the Virginia House of Delegates.'
An advocate for court reform, 5 Marshall refused, as an official
on the prestigious Council of State, to sanction a law which
authorized the governor to investigate the alleged misbehavior of
county magistrates. Marshall believed the law violated separation
29. Id. at 76-78. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765) (discussing common law methodology).
30. SMITH, supra note 1, at 78-79. Montesquieu articulated in inchoate
form the theory of separation of powers in those portions of his 1748 treatise,
The Spirit of the Laws (De L'Esprit des Loix), that discussed the English constitution and English law. For an overview of Montesquieu's work see J.
BRONOWSKI AND BRUCE MAZLISH, THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION:

FROM LEONARDO TO HEGEL 264-79 (Harper paper reprint. ed. 1975).
31. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 355-57 (1827)
(Marshall, C. J., dissenting) (discussing the post-Revolutionary economic crisis and the Contract Clause); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 203-06 (1819) (discussing the historical context of the Contract Clause).
32. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), Marshall unsuccessfully
argued on behalf of American debtors that a Virginia sequestration law during
the Revolution discharged their debts owed to British creditors. Id. Marshall
had represented the debtors in this litigation for several years. Conversely, in
1786, he argued on behalf of Philadelphia creditor Simon Nathan that Virginia could not escape its contractual obligation to him by paying its debts in
depreciated paper money rather than in hard currency. SMITH, supra note 1,
at 108-09.
33. SMITH, supra note 1, at 109-10. In Ogden, Marshall recounted the economic chaos of the 1780s in his discussion of the context of the formation of
the Contract Clause. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 355-57. He argued that the
Clause should apply to all debtor relief laws that impair the obligation of contracts and should be construed as a strict limitation upon state police powers.
Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
34. SMITH, supra note 1, at 87-114.
35. In part, Marshall's interest in court reform reflected his concern with
protecting property rights. SMITH, supra note 1, at 102.
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of powers by infringing upon judicial independence and conflicted
with the state's constitution."6 Smith astutely emphasizes this aspect of Marshall's early public career because it demonstrates
Marshall's devotion to the interrelated concepts of constitutional
supremacy and the need for an independent judiciary existed long
before his appointment to the Court.
Marshall reiterated this theme at the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788 in a stirring defense of federal judicial power.
Smith's account of this convention in which elected delegates debated whether Virginia should adopt the federal Constitution and
of Marshall's participation in the spirited proceedings provides an
essential perspective from which to appreciate Marshall's political
shrewdness and profound commitment to the Constitution.37
Moreover, the details of the convention reveal the ambivalence in
Virginia toward the creation of a federal system in which ultimate
political authority emanated from the people of the United States
as a whole and not from a compact of the individual states. Antifederalists led by the redoubtable Patrick Henry, a close friend
and future legal colleague of Marshall's, feared the proposed national government portended the destruction of the state's autonomy. In contrast, proponents of the Constitution, such as James
Madison, its principal architect, argued that a federal government
of enumerated powers would increase national unity yet leave the
states with a residuum of authority over matters within their own
borders.'
To Marshall fell the task of explaining the scope of federal
judicial power under Article III of the Constitution. Marshall articulated that federal judicial review was an essential means of
preserving the limitations of government in a constitutional democracy. He predicted the federal judiciary would function as the
guardian of the Constitution, its judges responsible for assessing
the constitutionality of governmental actions in order to protect
individual liberty from political tyranny.39 While Smith is careful
36. Id. at 93-96 (discussing the controversy over magistrate John Price
Posey in 1783).
37. Even before the convention, the Antifederalists sought to amend the
Constitution with a bill of rights and other limitations upon national authority
as a prerequisite for its ratification. See id. at 114. Afraid that this maneuver
might further delay ratification of the Constitution in Virginia and other
states, Marshall persuaded his fellow members of the Virginia House of Delegates to submit the Constitution in its original form to a special ratifying convention which would then decide whether to adopt the document. Id.
38. See generally Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the General
Good in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 261-299 (Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch, eds., 1989).
39. Marshall said: "To what quarter will you look for protection from an
infringement on the Constitution, if you will not -give the power to the
(federal] judiciary?" Speech of John Marshall at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 20, 1788, in I PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 277 (Charles Cullen
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to note that Marshall did not originate the doctrine of judicial review, 0 he suggests that Marshall's defense of federal judicial
power in 1788 anticipated his decisions years later in a series of
cases that proclaimed the Court's power to review federal and
state laws."'
Throughout his study Smith emphasizes Marshall's political
moderation and judicial temperament. Ironically, it is Marshall's
activities during the dozen years before he came to the Court that
many scholars believe indicate his penchant for partisan politics as
a judge. Smith refutes this perception by portraying Marshall as a
reluctant politician who preferred to build a thriving law practice
and live comfortably among family and friends in Richmond than
participate directly in the rough and tumble world of politics. 2 In
part, the evidence supports this premise. Marshall, by now a close
friend of President George Washington, and his personal attorney,
declined offers to become the United States Attorney General and
a minister to France so that he could concentrate on the Fairfax
litigation and other business matters. s However, as an ardent
supporter of the President's policy of neutrality in foreign relations
Marshall became strongly identified with the Federalist party in
Virginia. In addition, he endorsed the controversial Jay treaty
with Great Britain, which further involved Marshall in partisan
political debates about the course of American foreign policy.
In a detailed analysis of Marshall's foreign service and subsequent public life in the interlude before his judicial career, Smith
demonstrates that Marshall remained politically moderate and
faithful to his constitutional principles. For example, as a special
envoy to France in 1797-98 Marshall consistently refused to accede
to the outlandish demands of French foreign minister Talleyrand
ed., 1974).

40. Early cases in Virginia include Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 VA Cases 20 (Va.

Gen Ct. 1793); Case of the Judges, 4 Call. 142, 146 (Va. Ct. App. 1788); and
Commonwealth. v. Caton, 4 Call. 5 (Va. Ct. App. 1782).
41. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (sustaining
the Court's power to review state laws); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87 (1810) (declaring unconstitutional a Georgia law); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (invalidating a federal law under Article III of the
Constitution).
42. SMITH, supra note 1, at 144-68.
43. In the late 1780s through 1796, Marshall represented the British heirs
of Lord Fairfax, who claimed title to land in Northern Virginia that the state
had confiscated through various laws. Id. at 164-68. Eventually, Marshall
helped negotiate a settlement on behalf of the heirs. Id. In 1793, three years
before the legislative compromise which settled the dispute, Marshall contracted to purchase 215,000 acres of the Fairfax manor lands with his brother,
James, from the Reverend Denny Martin Fairfax, conditioned upon Fairfax
receiving valid title to the land. Id. Marshall's involvement and interest in
the Fairfax land precluded him from formally participating in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch), 603 (1812) and Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Id.
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that the United States provide France with a loan that would help
that country in its war with England and subvert American neutrality in foreign relations."
Similarly, as a member of Congress, Marshall's respect for the
Constitution outweighed his loyalty to a particular political party.
Although a leader of the moderate wing of the Federalists, Marshall considered the Sedition Act unconstitutional and thought it
exacerbated political tensions with its provision for punishment of
those who criticized the President. Consequently, Marshall joined
the Republicans in voting to repeal this act.45 In a separate incident, although Marshall supported President Adams's unpopular
extradition of a British seaman, he did so, Smith argues, not because of party politics, but from a belief that the President acted
within his inherent foreign policy authority pursuant to the separation of powers implicit within the Constitution.'6 In essence,
Marshall's was a legal decision rather than a political one, and it
foreshadowed his Supreme Court opinions that set forth the limits
of federal judicial power in cases where individual claimants
sought redress in federal courts for injuries sustained because of
foreign policy or military actions of public officials. 7
Marshall even refrained from partisan intervention in the
presidential election of 1800 in which two Republican candidates,
Aaron Burr and Thomas Jefferson, received an identical number of
electoral votes and soundly defeated the Federalist incumbent,
44. As England and France waged war in Europe, each country tried to
lure America into the conflict, often seizing American ships and disrupting
commerce. To alleviate diplomatic tension with France and to preserve
American neutrality, President Adams dispatched Marshall and two other
commissioners, Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, and Charles Coatsworth
Pinckney, of South Carolina, to France in the late spring of 1797. The infamous XYZ affair (letters used by Marshall in his diplomatic correspondence to
identify Talleyrand's agents) arose from Talleyrand's ploy to secure a bribe
and French war fluds from the United States as a prerequisite for negotiating
with the American ministers. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 182-233, for an excellent discussion of the XYZ affair.
45. Smith's discussion actually corrects previous misconceptions that Marshall supported the Alien and Sedition laws in the Virginia legislature prior to
his stint in Congress. Id. at 239, 242-44, 263, 601 n.79. Cf BEVERIDGE, supra note 17, at 402 (inferring from the correspondence from Alexander Hamilton in 1799, that Marshall, himself, defended the Alien and Sedition laws before the Virginia legislature in 1798).
46. SMITH, supra note 1, at 259-61 (discussing Marshall's views of the
Robbins affair).
47. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812) (ruling a foreign affairs issue non-justiciable); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) (holding questions of foreign policy
non-justiciable); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) (holding war
powers non-justiciable); cf Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)
(invalidating a Presidential order to capture a ship sailing from a French
port).
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John Adams. Despite Marshall's intense personal dislike for Jefferson, he declined to endorse Burr despite the entreaties of leading Federalists. Yet, as he confided to Alexander Hamilton, Marshall "could not bring himself to support Mr. Jefferson... ,8 and
refused to denigrate him in public.
Marshall's complicated relationship with Jefferson comprises
a significant portion of this biography. As Smith explains: "One
cannot understand Marshall without an appreciation of his relationship with Thomas Jefferson, just as one cannot understand his
tenure as chief justice except in the context of the exceptional circumstances that brought both men to power in 1801.""' Despite
their shared heritage as distant cousins, theirs was a mutual animosity borne of distrust and misconception. Both were raised in
Virginia, Jefferson among the Tidewater aristocrats, and Marshall
on the frontier, and although each studied law with George Wythe,
they developed fundamentally different notions of constitutional
democracy that formed the backdrop against which their personal
differences emerged. While Marshall accorded considerable significance to popular sovereignty, he remained inherently skeptical
of democratic majorities and believed that the Constitution prescribed limitations upon governmental authority to preserve the
rights of the few against the tyrannical excesses of the many.,0 In
large part, his caution emanated from his devotion to property
rights and from his observation that the self-interest of political
factions occasionally jeopardized the long-term objectives of the
community. Unable to trust completely the will of democratic
majorities, Marshall perceived in judicial review the means for ensuring that their ephemeral whims did not transcend the limits
upon government the people themselves had created through the
provisions of the Constitution. 1
In contrast, Jefferson extolled the virtues of republican democracy and dwelled little upon the potential for tyranny in majority rule, believing that legislators were more likely to represent the
popular will than unelected judges, whose insistence upon reviewing the constitutionality of statutes he regarded with suspicion. 2
Jefferson, unlike Marshall, never really accepted the premise of
popular sovereignty as the basis for constitutional government and
throughout his public career advocated, in one form or another,
the doctrine of states' rights, which viewed the federal union as a

48. SMITH, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting letter from John Marshall to Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 1, 1801), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS 46-47).
49. Id. at8.
50. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
51. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819);
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138.
52. For a general discussion of Jefferson's views, see DAVID N. MAYER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 257-94 (1995).
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confederation of states rather than as a creation of the American
people as a whole.53 Under this theory the Constitution narrowly
prescribed the powers of the national government in favor of those
of the states, and Jefferson, like other Republicans, remained critical of Federalist policies he believed undermined the sovereignty of
the states in favor of a strong federal government.
Within this context Smith presents the conflict between Marshall and Jefferson as part of a larger one between states' rights
advocates and proponents of a coherent union that influenced the
course of American politics and perceptions about constitutional
law. Unlike previous Marshall biographers, he is careful to distinguish between the personal antipathy of these statesmen and their
views about law and government.' This is important because neither Marshall nor Jefferson was as politically radical as the other
apparently thought. Marshall considered Jefferson a demagogue
and underestimated his difficulties with restraining the more extreme elements of the Republican party. Similarly, Jefferson believed Marshall was a hypocrite who used his judicial position to
further orthodox Federalist politics.' Yet, despite their fears of
each other, both were statesmen, who Smith contends sought to
avoid direct constitutional confrontation as Chief Justice and
President of the United States, and "maintained an uneasy equilibrium that personified the separation of powers."' Viewed from
this perspective, Marshall's performance as Chief Justice becomes
as significant for his ability to focus the Court's attention on questions of law as for his jurisprudence.

II. THE CHIEF JUSTICE DEFINES A NATION
A central premise of Smith's biography is that Marshall solidified the legitimacy of the Court by removing it from partisan
politics. He suggests that Marshall's decisions about judicial review not only asserted the independence of the federal judiciary to
interpret the Constitution but recognized limits upon federal
53. See id. at 199-228 (discussing Jefferson's authorship of the 1798 Ken-"
tucky Resolutions in which he articulated the states' rights compact theory).
54. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 18, 63 (criticizing Beveridge's analysis of
the Marshall-Jefferson relationship), 301, 333-34 (comparing views of Marshall and Jefferson).
55. Id. at 333. In this regard, Jefferson remarked:
[when conversing with Marshall, I never admit anything. So sure as
you admit any position to be good, no matter how remote from the conclusion he seeks to establish, you are gone. So great is his sophistry you
must never give him an affirmative answer or you will be forced to
grant his conclusion. Why if he were to ask me if it were daylight or
not, I'd reply, 'Sir, I don't know, I can't tell.'
SMITH, supra note 1, at 12 (quoting DILLON, supra note 17, at 370 (quoting
Joseph Story's funeral eulogy of John Marshall (July 1835))).
56. Id. at 333.
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courts based upon separation of powers and the constraints of federalism. While Smith does not examine in any real depth the jurisprudence of the Marshall Court, he sees its main constitutional
decisions as evidence of Marshall's genius for differentiating the
rule of law from political expediency and his respect for the supremacy of the Constitution.
In cases involving federal judicial power the Court, under
Marshall's lead, exercised its authority to review the constitutionality of federal57 and state laws,' yet declared federal courts
could not assess questions of foreign59 or military' policy without
infringing upon the coordinate branches of the national government. Similarly, while the Court recognized the importance of a
strong national government, it declined from interpreting the Constitution in a manner that sanctioned the usurpation of local police
powers by federal authorities. 1 For example, Marshall's opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden,62 expressly acknowledged that states could
regulate purely local commerce or enact quarantine laws pursuant
to their Tenth Amendment police powers even though the Constitution prohibited their restriction of interstate commerce.Y Smith,
quite reasonably, concludes that this indicates the Marshall Court
actually used its authority of judicial review defensively to protect
the federal union from dissolution by individual states. 64
Smith often substitutes extensive doctrinal analysis of leading
Marshall Court cases for discussions of their historical context to
demonstrate the extent to which the justices sought to adjudicate
legal and constitutional issues in a politically neutral manner. He
argues, for example, that in Marbury v. Madison,' the Court actually sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the executive
branch in a case whose origins reflected a bitter political dispute

57. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Story, J.); Fletcher v. Peck,

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
59. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116

(1812) (ruling foreign affairs' questions non-justiciable); United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) (holding questions of foreign
policy non-justiciable).
60. See, e.g., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) (ruling war powers non-justiciable). Cf Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)
(invalidating Presidential order to capture ships sailing from French port).
61. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
(1829) (sustaining state law authorizing a dammed creek as a legitimate local
police power measure not in conflict with the Commerce Clause).
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
63. Id. at 188-240.
64. SMITH, supra note 1, at 445, 477-79. See also HOBSON, supra note 7, at
142-49.
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also SMITH, supra note 1, at 300-26
(discussing Marbury as a non-partisan decision).
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over an undelivered Justice of the Peace commission during the
transition in power between the Federalists and Republicans.
Marshall clearly perceived the controversy over Madison's refusal to deliver Marbury's commission as a political one.6 He also
realized that the legal remedy sought by Marbury, a writ of mandamus issued by the Court as an exercise of its original jurisdiction, required the Court to review the constitutionality of the federal law that created this remedy. This Marshall considered
within the province of the Court,67 and although he ruled invalid
that portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which unconstitutionally
enlarged the Court's jurisdiction," Marshall was careful to explain
that the Court could not review matters within the political discretion of the executive branch.69
The irony of Marbury is that Marshall, a Federalist judge, refused to order a Republican administration to deliver a minor judicial commission to a Federalist businessman who brought suit in
the Supreme Court pursuant to a provision of law enacted by a
Federalist legislature."0 Although Smith notes that Marbury acted
in response to heavy pressure from High Federalists, who sought
to involve the Court in a partisan debate with the Republicans, he
does not consider whether Marshall should have recused himself
from this case. As Madison's predecessor as Secretary of State,
Marshall failed to deliver Marbury's Justice of the Peace commission in the first place.7' This odd circumstance, however, does not

66. See William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DuKE L.J. 1, 1-6, for an excellent discussion of the political context of
this case. See also ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, Marbury v. Madison AND
JUDIcIAL REVIEW 81-101 (1989) (in part, criticizing Van Alstyne's conclusions

about Marbury).
67. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170-80.
68. Id. at 173-80. The federal provision in issue was section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789), which provided in relevant part:
'[the] Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction... and shall have
power to issue... writs of mandamus... to any persons holding office under
the authority of the United States." See id. (discussing the Judiciary Act of
1789).
69. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164-66, 169-70.

70. President John Adams, in the waning hours of his "lame duck" administration, appointed William Marbury as a District of Columbia justice of the
peace, pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1801 (Act of February 27, 1801, ch. 15,
sec. 11, 2 Stat. 107), in an attempt by the Federalists to pack the lower courts
with their own party members. See generally Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803). Marshall, Adams' Secretary of State, originally failed to deliver Marbury's commission, which President Jefferson found atop a desk when he assumed power. Id. Jefferson, under statutory authority, chose not to honor
Marbury's commission and thus did not require James Madison, Marshall's
successor as Secretary of State, to deliver the commission. Id. Thereafter,
Marbury's lawyers filed a motion in the Supreme Court demanding Madison
to show cause as to why he should not deliver the commission. Id.
71. Van Alstyne, supra note 66, at 4, 8. Curiously, Smith does not explain
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detract from Marbury's points about the scope of judicial review.
Curiously, Smith does not really address whether the Court
acted improperly in deciding the constitutional question presented
by this case once it concluded it lacked jurisdiction to issue a mandamus upon Madison."2 Normally, a federal court must first determine if it has jurisdiction to hear a particular case. If it concludes that it does not, it must then dismiss it.13 In Marbury, the
Court cleverly avoided this quandary by characterizing the real issue as one of its power to review the constitutionality of a law that
expanded its original jurisdiction.
Marbury, however, was not nearly as controversial as those
decisions involving the Court's authority to review state laws. In
this regard, Smith's discussion of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,7 4 Cohens v. Virginia '5and McCulloch v. Maryland " is quite informative, as it demonstrates that the conflict was in essence one over
the nature of federalism with important ramifications for the survival of slavery in the union. In particular, Smith explains that
states' rights advocates believed that the Court's broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch 7 signified
why Marshall did not recuse himself in this case but did recuse himself in
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803) and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). In Stuart, decided less than a week after Marbury, the Court sustained the constitutionality of a Republican judiciary law
(Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, sec. 1, 2 Stat. 132) that repealed the Circuit
Courts Act of 1801 (Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89) and reinstated the
requirement that Supreme Court justices ride on circuit. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 308-09. Marshall recused himself in this case because he had
heard the legal dispute while on circuit. Id.
72. Van Alstyne, supra note 66, at 6-8. Cf CLINTON, supra note 66, at 8891 (arguing that "summary disposition of Marbury's complaint would... have
been disingenuous...").
73. See, e.g., Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869).
74. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Story, J.).
75. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
76. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Smith, unfortunately, does not further
address the Court's analysis of federal question jurisdiction. In 1824, in a
case that emanated from the McCulloch controversy, the Court sustained federal question jurisdiction when the Ohio branch of the U.S. Bank sued an
Ohio official in local federal district court, alleging the unconstitutionality of
an Ohio tax on the bank's operations. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824). This is an important case because it complements the
Court's rulings in Martin and Cohens and sets forth the genesis of the wellpleaded complaint rule in federal jurisdiction.
77. Article One, Section Eight, Clause 18 of the United States Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power, "[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States ....
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In McCulloch, the Court sustained
the constitutionality of the United States Bank as a necessary and proper
means for the federal government to accomplish its enumerated powers under
Article I of the Constitution. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404-25. The
Court also ruled a Maryland tax on the Bank's operations unconstitutional
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an assault upon state police powers. They feared that if it was
constitutional for the federal government, in the absence of a specific enumerated power, to operate a bank, the federal judiciary
might similarly sustain Congressional legislation prohibiting the
8
expansion of slavery into western territories."
Moreover, they regarded the Court's assertion of its appellate jurisdiction to review
the constitutionality of state laws as inconsistent with a state's
prerogative to decide such issues for itself without interference
from the federal judiciary."9
Consistent with his overall premise, Smith considers the
states' rights attacks on the Supreme Court during Marshall's
tenure as an attempt by states such as Virginia," Pennsylvania8
and Georgia 2 to chip away at the federal government through its
judicial branch. Accordingly, he explains the Court's opinions sustaining federal judicial authority to review state laws and invalidate those in conflict with the Constitution as an attempt by the
justices, particularly Marshall and Joseph Story,83 to preserve the
nation from the petty jealousies of the states. Indeed, this conclusion finds ample support in Marshall's correspondence with Story
at the time as well as his newspaper articles in defense of the Constitution and federal judicial review.84
because the tax subverted the principle of constitutional supremacy. Id. at
425-37.
78. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 453-55 (discussing states' rights, the controversy over the Missouri Compromise and federal judicial review of state
laws).
79. The most strident critics were Virginia judges William Brockenbrough
and Spencer Roane and theorist John Taylor. The 1819 Richmond Enquirer
essays of Brockenbrough and Roane appear in John Marshall's defense of
McCulloch v. Maryland, 52-154 (John Gunther, ed., 1969), along with Marshall's responses in the Alexandria Gazette. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 155214. Taylor vilified McCulloch and reiterated the compact theory of states'
rights in his treatise, Construction Construed and Constitution Vindicated

(1820). For an analysis of the conflict over Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction see Olken, John Marshall and Spencer Roane, supra note 11.

80. SMITH, supra note 1, at 446-68 (discussing Virginia judicial, legislative
and political opposition to the Court's exercise ofjudicial review).
81. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (arising from
Pennsylvania's refusal to follow a federal court order that it reimburse a prize
claimant under federal law).
82. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (both involving the conflict between
Georgia and federal Indian policy).
83. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Story, J.).
Marshall recused himself because of his extensive involvement in the litigation as a Virginia attorney and landowner whose own property rights were
affected by the Virginia escheat law and federal treaties in issue. Smith,
however, omits extensive discussion of Marshall's involvement in the federal
judicial proceedings.

See Olken, John Marshall and Spencer Roane, supra

note 11, at 132-33.
84. See sources cited supra note 79.
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Smith also explains that the Court, especially during Marshall's initial decade as Chief Justice, confronted tremendous pressure from the political branches of the federal government that
threatened its independence. For instance, within a year of its
decision in Marbury, radical Republicans, beyond the control of
President Jefferson, initiated impeachment proceedings against
one of Marshall's colleagues on the Court, Samuel Chase, charging
him with misconduct as a circuit court judge in controversial cases
from years before involving the notorious Sedition Act.85 Ultimately, the Senate acquitted Justice Chase, but the incident underscored the political maelstrom which surrounded the Court in
its early years and compelled Marshall to refrain from using the
powers of the federal judiciary to resolve political disputes.
In addition, as the circuit court justice presiding over the 1807
treason trial of Aaron Burr, Marshall effectively removed the judicial branch from partisan politics when he rejected President
Jefferson's claim of an absolute executive privilege and ordered
him to provide Burr's counsel with documents essential to the defense.8" In this same case Marshall also refused to distort the constitutional definition of treason rather than succumb to political
expediency.87 Burr's acquittal no doubt annoyed the President and
his fellow Republicans, but as Smith astutely explains, Marshall's
equanimity and judicial probity solidified the role of federal courts
in upholding the Constitution in cases involving even the most unsympathetic parties.
Notwithstanding the many virtues of this biography, its
analysis of the Marshall Court's jurisprudence contains some
flaws, which although they do not detract from the author's main
points nevertheless merit attention. The book's weaknesses in this
respect emerge most clearly in its discussion of the Court's Contract Clause cases.
Although Smith notes the correlation between federal judicial
review, constitutional supremacy and federalism, he probably does
not place enough emphasis upon the Marshall Court's Contract
Clause decisions from this perspective. For throughout the early
nineteenth century the principal vehicle by which the Court reviewed state laws was the Contract Clause," a specific constitutional prohibition of state power to impair the obligation of con-

85. SMITH, supra note 1, at 336-37, 342-47.

86. See id. at 352-74 (discussing Burr's treason case).
87. Id. at 359-74. See, e.g., United States v. Burr 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (No. 14, 963).
88. In relevant part the Contract Clause provides, "[n]o State shall... pass
any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1938), for the notion that this clause dominated antebellum
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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tracts. While Smith discusses most of the leading cases, he should
clarify that not only were they examples of the Court's attempt to
protect the rights of private property and contracts from the tyranny of democratic majorities, but that they also represented specific opportunities for the Court to assess the constitutionality of
state laws.9
Moreover, Smith's discussion of the Court's Contract Clause
jurisprudence could probably explain in more depth the divisions
within the Court over the meaning of the term contract obligation.
While most of the justices accepted the notion that land grants'
and corporate charters" comprised contracts within the purview of
the Contract Clause, differences emerged over the extent to which
states could regulate contractual performance. To one extent or
another the individual justices accepted states could impair contractual remedies without destroying contract rights or obligations,9 but some loosely construed this distinction and thought
state law often created contract rights," a premise with which
John Marshall personally disagreed.' In addition, Justice William
Johnson and others adopted a relatively permissive attitude toward state insolvency laws that discharged contractual obligations.9 5
John Marshall, Bushrod Washington and Joseph Story, however, were more hesitant to acknowledge a formal distinction be-

89. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810).
90. Id. at 138.
91. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
92. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 256-61 (1827)
(Washington, J.), 271-92 (Johnson, J., seriatim opinion); Green v. Biddle, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 96-107 (1823) (Johnson, J., concurring ) (emphasizing importance of state police powers); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 144-

45 (1810) (Johnson, J. concurring). For discussion of the Marshall Court Contract Clause jurisprudence see Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and
the Blaisdell Decision:A Historical Study of Contract Clause Jurisprudence,
72 Or. L. Rev. 513, 522-32, 536-38 (1993) [hereinafter Olken, Contract Clause
Jurisprudence].

93. See, e.g., Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 282-92 (Johnson, J., seriatim
opinion), 297-300, 305-08 (Thompson, J., seriatim opinion) and 316, 327
(Trimble, J., seriatim opinion).

94. Id. at 343-47, 353 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 253-70 (Washington, J.), 271-92 (Johnson, J., seriatim opinion),
292-313 (Thompson, J., seriatim opinion) and 314-31 (Trimble, J., seriatim
opinion) (all sustaining a prospective insolvency law). Cf. Sturges v. Crownin-

shield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (invalidating a retroactive insolvency
law). However, as Johnson remarked in Ogden, Sturges was a compromise
decision that never resolved all the Contract Clause issues pertaining to insolvency laws. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 272-73 (Johnson, J., seriatim
opinion). In fact, Johnson had sustained the New York insolvency statute in
issue in Sturges while on circuit. See Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. 141
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66).
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tween contract rights and remedies and narrowly construed the
scope of state police powers." The division between the justices
manifested itself most clearly in Ogden v. Saunders," in which,
over the dissents of Marshall, Story and Duvall, the Court sustained a New York law that prospectively discharged the payment
of debts. Although Smith discusses this case, his analysis is unclear because he does not address the dichotomy between contract
rights and remedies that occupied the Court during this time. Instead, he views Ogden as an aberration since it was the only major
constitutional decision from which Marshall dissented.
Indeed, for Smith one of the most significant aspects of Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice was the unanimity of the Court in
the vast majority of cases. Prior to 1801, Supreme Court justices
issued seriatim opinions which revealed their individual views
about legal issues but did little to foster a perception of the Court's
unity.'
This troubled Marshall, who insisted that the Court,
whenever possible, should issue a single opinion delivered by the
Chief Justice." As Smith explains, Marshall's motive was not to
create an imperial judiciary, but rather to enhance the Court's legitimacy and increase public confidence in its decisions.1" In large
96. See, e.g., Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 337, 343, 346-50, 353-56
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (Story joined in this opinion); Green v. Biddle, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 84, 92 (1823) (Washington, J.) (applying the Contract
Clause to a compact between states that affected property rights of third parties). But cf Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 259-61, 267 (Washington, J.)
(sustaining an insolvency law that prospectively affected contract rights).
Washington distinguished between prospective and retrospective laws that
affected the obligation of contracts. Id.
97. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
98. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (sustaining a Connecticut law that set aside a probate decree, but two of the justices, Iredell
and Chase, articulated quite different theories about the limitations upon
legislative authority). In Calder, Justice Samuel Chase invoked natural law
when he said, "[aln [act] of the [1]egislature ... contrary to the great first
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority." Id. at 388 (Chase, J., seriatim opinion). In contrast,
Justice James Iredell criticized natural law as the basis of constitutional adjudication:
[Ildeas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest
and purest men have differed upon the subject ... [i]f... the
[1]egislature ... shall pass a law, within the general scope
of... [its]... constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be
void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to principles of
natural justice.
Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., seriatim opinion).
99. Marshall wrote 547 opinions for the Court during his tenure as Chief
Justice, "all the other. . justices combined wrote 574 such opinions." G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835

191 (abridged paper. ed. 1991).
100. SMITH, supra note 1, at 284-87, 293. Marshall borrowed this concept
from Edmund Pendleton, Chief Judge of the Virginia Court of Appeals in the
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part, Marshall attained these objectives, yet his success at forming
consensus among his judicial colleagues and his authorship of
most of the Court's opinions also fostered the notion that he forced
the other members of the Court to adopt his views. 1 1 Smith, however, refutes this perception and claims that "Marshall led the
Court, but his leadership was collegial. The justices reasoned collectively, even when Marshall assembled the final product. In that
sense he was the moderator, not the master, of the Court and he
2
wore his authority with gentle deference." '"
Possessed of considerable personal charm with a facile mind
and keen political instincts, Marshall implicitly understood the
importance of collaborative decisionmaking and worked hard to
solicit the ideas of his fellow justices. To this extent, Smith attributes much of the Court's unity to Marshall's efforts in having the
justices board together, where away from their families they could
discuss cases over meals and enjoy each other's company over a
glass of wine.'ln
In addition, Smith notes that, as a whole, the justices shared
similar judicial values; they revered the Constitution, believed in
the importance of an independent federal judiciary and endorsed a
strong national government.'
From this common set of beliefs
they forged a collective identity which transcended their individual
politics"6 and ultimately strengthened the Court's role as the
guardian of the Constitution.
Smith supports his contention about the Marshall Court's coherence in two other ways. First, at the conclusion of his discussion of each Court term, he specifically mentions how many of the
cases were unanimous and the number of opinions Marshall wrote
for the Court. Second, he relies extensively upon figures from the
middle period of Marshall's tenure, 1812-23, during which the
Court decided some of its most important cases about federalism
and the same justices remained on the Court. In this period the
Court decided 457 cases, 437 of which were unanimous, and Marshall himself authored many of the Court's opinions."
Yet, despite this impressive array of statistics, the Court may

late eighteenth century. Id. at 193.
101. See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466, 469 (1983) (referring to "John Marshall and the
Six Dwarfs").
102. SMITH, supra note 1, at 402. See also HOBSON, supra note 7, at 16.
103. SMITH, supra note 1, at 286-87, 351-52, 377-78, 402-03. "Marshall lubricated the wheels of justice with fine Madeira .... " Id. at 403.
104. Id. at 403-04; HOBSON, supra note 7, at 10.
105. By the second decade of Marshall's tenure on the Court, five of the
seven justices were Republicans. Only Marshall and Washington had been
Federalists.
106. SMITH, supra note 1, at 469.
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not have been as unanimous as Smith would have one believe. 0 7
Even though he briefly mentions differences among the justices in
cases arising from the War of 1812,1°0 he barely mentions those
over other issues.'" Instead, Smith prefers to emphasize Marshall's ability to foster general consensus within the Court. Given
his premise that Marshall sought to enhance the Court's legitimacy through means intended to insulate it from partisan politics,
this approach makes sense. However, Smith, at times, may obscure important theoretical differences among individual justices
that eventually influenced substantive constitutional doctrines.
He attributes, for example, to Justice Johnson an ardent nationalism that does not take into account Johnson's marked tolerance for
state police powers in the context of the Contract Clause"0 nor his
doubts about the exclusivity of federal bankruptcy authority."' Interestingly, Smith perceives Marshall's majority opinion in Sturges
v. Crowninshield 12 as a compromise between Johnson's views and
those of Justice Story,"' yet he dwells relatively little upon the importance of these theoretical differences.

107. G. Edward White suggests that the Court's unanimity may be deceptive
because the practice of having, whenever possible, a single opinion of the
Court, may have, at times, "conceal[ed] the views of most individual justices."
WHITE, supra note 99, at 194. Indeed, Justice Johnson implied as much when
he explained that the Court's opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield was "a compromise. . . ." Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 272-73 (1827)

(Johnson, J., seriatim opinion). White, in part, attributes much of the justices'
acquiescence to their common lodgings and to their desire for maintaining a
smooth working and personal relationship. WHITE, supra note 99, at 184-95.
108. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) (a divided Court rejecting the notion of inherent presidential authority). See
SMITH, supra note 1, at 417-19, for a further discussion of the rejection of inherent presidential authority.
109. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20-30 (1831)
(Johnson, J., concurring), 31-50 (Baldwin, J., concurring) and 50-80
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (holding that because Indian tribes were not foreign nations within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, the Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear their dispute with Georgia). Smith does not account for
Justice Johnson's many concurring and dissenting opinions during his years
on the Marshall Court.
110. See, e.g., Ogden 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 271-92 (Johnson, J., seriatim
opinion); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 94-104 (1823) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
111. See, e.g., Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 273-81 (Johnson, J., seriatim
opinion) (arguing that the states have concurrent bankruptcy powers). Marshall also shared these doubts. Writing to Bushrod Washington in 1814, Marshall expressed skepticism over whether Congress had exclusive power to
regulate bankruptcy. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 97.
112. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
113. Story and Bushrod Washington believed Congress had exclusive power
to regulate bankruptcy. They also thought a retroactive insolvency law impaired the obligation of contracts. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 439-40, 658
n. 116 (discussing their views and Sturges).
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Similarly, Smith invokes Dartmouth College v. Woodward""
as a prime example of Marshall's skill at negotiating compromise
among his colleagues, but in so doing he omits discussion of the internal debate between the justices over natural law, the common
law doctrine of vested rights and the scope of state police powers."'
While Marshall's opinion is significant in that it applied the Contract Clause to protect corporate charters,1 '6 Story's concurrence, in
which he set forth the doctrine of reserved state powers, 1 7 actually
was more influential in the development of Contract Clause jurisprudence during the remainder of the nineteenth century.1 '
These, however, are relatively minor criticisms which should
not diminish the importance of this book as a detailed study of
John Marshall's life. Unlike a traditional judicial biography,
Smith chooses to understand his subject through extensive analysis of his personal character and the events that shaped his actions. Historical context rather than jurisprudential doctrine comprises the principal focus of Smith's book, which more than any
other previous Marshall biography reveals the jurist as a multifaceted individual whose public existence, at times, contrasted significantly with his private sorrow. Indeed, as Marshall's public career flourished, he and his wife, Polly, endured the heartbreak of
several children dying, and separations from each other, as Marshall presided over the Supreme Court in Washington and rode
circuit in North Carolina. Even more poignant was Polly's fragile
emotional condition and constant depression during most of their
lengthy marriage.119
Interspersed throughout the chronicle of Marshall's years on
the Court are references to aspects of Marshall's personal life that
underscore his tenacity, optimism, intellectual curiosity and playfulness. 2 ' Although Marshall served on the Court for thirty-four

114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
115. See WHITE, supra note 99, at 622-28 (discussing the theoretical differ-

ences between Johnson, Story and Marshall).
116. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 644, 653-54 (Marshall, C. J.)
(ruling that New Hampshire unconstitutionally revoked Dartmouth College's
charter with a series of acts that transformed the college from a private, eleemosynary, educational institution into a public university).
117. Id. at 675, 708-12 (Story, J., concurring). "ITihe rights legally vested in
a corporation cannot be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent statute,
unless a power for that purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation." Id. at 708.
118. The Court adopted Story's reservation theory in Providence Bank v.
Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830) (ruling that, absent express language in a
bank charter, the state did not relinquish its power to tax the bank). See
Olken, Contract Clause Jurisprudence, supra note 92, at 536-52 (discussing
nineteenth century Contract Clause jurisprudence).
119. SMITH, supra note 1, at 107, 122, 161, 185-86, 188, 217, 237, 375-76,
395,433, 503-04, 511-12.

120. Throughout his life Marshall enjoyed the company of others, theatre,
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years, the annual Court term was fairly short and his circuit court
duties lasted only for a few months. As a result, much of each year
Marshall lived in Richmond or on his farm in Fauquier County.
For this reason a significant strength of Smith's biography is the
emphasis it places upon the importance of Marshall's life away
from the Court. Accordingly, Smith balances discussion of. Marshall's judicial duties with relevant information about his work on
a multi-volume biography of George Washington and other projects that illuminate the depth of his character and perhaps shaped
the contours of his jurisprudence.' 2
Smith's discussion of Marshall's friendships with James Monroe, Patrick Henry and colleagues on the Court such as Bushrod
Washington and Joseph Story demonstrates Marshall's genial nature and innate ability to make friends, qualities which aided Marshall as Chief Justice. Smith's attention to the personal details of
Marshall's life is not entirely flawless, however. For example, he
never really explores why, despite Marshall's personal distaste for
the institution of slavery, he kept a few slaves as servants in his
house.'22 Yet, as a whole, Smith's biography succeeds where others
have disappointed because it explains the historical relevance of
the entirety of Marshall's life, and thus provides an essential perspective from which to assess his remarkable achievements.
III. HOBSON AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S JURISPRUDENCE
In contrast, Charles Hobson's slender volume concentrates
upon the jurisprudence of John Marshall. Drawing upon Marshall's many constitutional opinions, surviving remnants of his
food and drink, and playing all sorts of sports. In 1788, the gregarious Marshall helped create the Richmond Quoits Club, comprised of several of Richmond's most prominent men, who every Saturday during the summer held a
lavish barbecue and played the game of quoits. Marshall participated in this
club's functions for nearly the rest of his life. SMITH, supra note 1, at 160-61.
Marshall also loved literature, and especially, poetry. Id. at 376-77, 484-85,
515. See also id. at 3-4 (discussing Marshall's humor and optimism).
121. Id. at 329-32 (suggesting Marshall's biography of Washington reflected
his constitutional nationalism as a jurist). See also id. at 411-13 (discussing
Marshall's leadership of an expedition to survey a commercial route between
the James River and the Appalachian Mountains in Virginia as evidence of
Marshall's interest in economic development).
122. Marshall, who opposed slavery in general, nevertheless owned a few
slaves, whom he used as house servants. He also opposed radical abolitionism, and preferred the gradual elimination of slavery and the recolonization of
slaves in Africa. In fact, he helped create the Virginia Society for Colonization
in 1827. SMITH, supra note 1, at 162, 488-90. Other leading statesmen also
demonstrated contradictory attitudes toward slavery. For example, Marshall's good friend, James Monroe, as President championed recolonization
but also maintained slaves on his Virginia plantation. See ALAN T. NOLAN,
LEE CONSIDERED: GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE AND CIVIL WAR HISTORY 9-29

(1991), for analysis of the conflicting public and private views of other leading
Virginians toward slavery.
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personal correspondence, legal papers and circuit court decisions
Hobson reaches similar conclusions as Smith about Marshall's importance as a jurist. While both authors assert that Marshall
sought to maintain the independence of the federal judiciary from
partisan politics, subtle differences emerge in their arguments.
Whereas Smith emphasizes Marshall's political skills as Chief
Justice and the political context of his cases, Hobson deemphasizes these points in order to underscore the distinction between law and politics in Marshall's jurisprudence."2 In his view,
Marshall believed in a constitutional democracy in which limited
government was essential to the protection of individual rights.
Hobson's John Marshall inherently distrusted popular majorities
and invoked the doctrine of judicial review to preserve the rule of
law as the basis of constitutional government.
In essence, Hobson contends that Marshall "adapt[ed] the
methods of common law interpretation to the task of expounding
the Constitution.""2 He suggests that Marshall regarded the Constitution as the fundamental law of the nation but construed it in
accord with common law rules of statutory construction to refrain
from imbuing it with his own personal or political biases."2 Accordingly, Hobson places Marshall within a common law tradition
in which judges exercised broad discretion in the application of
statutory law and precedent to legal disputes. Although aware of
the precise nuances of case law, jurists such as Edmund Pendleton
and George Wythe, in whose Virginia courts Marshall frequently
appeared during the late eighteenth century, often preferred to
reason from general principles in reaching pragmatic conclusions.126 Consequently, they relied less on precedent than on inductive analysis of the law. Many of Marshall's own constitutional
opinions as Chief Justice also demonstrated this characteristic as
he eschewed copious citation to cases in favor of general statements about controlling legal rules." 7
Hobson's description of Marshall's extensive common law
background provides an essential perspective from which to assess his jurisprudence. Rather than portray Marshall as a natural

123. HOBSON, supra note 7, at xiii.
124. Id. at xii.
125. Id. at 42-43, 52, 137-38, 208. While on the Court, Marshall said:
"Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
the Judge...." Osborn v. Bank of the United States., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824).
126. Id. at 33-43.
127. Id. at 182, 190-92. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819);

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), all leading constitutional
decisions which contained relatively few citations to cases in support of general legal principles.
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rights jurist"' or as an especially partisan political judge, Hobson
explains that Marshall's understanding of the common law influenced his perceptions about the Constitution.129 For example, he
invoked common law principles in his application of the Contract
Clause to land grants and corporate charters.1 3' Like common law
jurists before him, Marshall did not hesitate to use the law to protect property rights from the turbulence of political factions.'' Indeed, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 3' Marshall explicitly
rejected the notion that the grant of a corporate charter was an exercise of political power by the state and thus subject to the vicissitudes of majority rule.3 3 In this respect, Hobson's emphasis upon
the common law aspects of Marshall's jurisprudence lends credence to the notion advanced by some historians that Marshall's
aversion toward political factions anticipated the rise of substantive due process. ''
One particular strength of Hobson's book is its lucid discussion of the common law basis of judicial review. Hobson explains
that the rise of popular sovereignty and the development of written constitutions required judges, trained in common law methods,
to assess the limits of governmental authority. Despite the wide
latitude they enjoyed in construing the law, most common law jurists differentiated between judicial interpretation of statutes and
lawmaking, which they understood as the prescribed role of the
legislature in a constitutional democracy. 35 The common law judicial tradition with which Marshall identified emphasized the responsibility of judges to engage in dispassionate analysis of the
law in order to ensure that the whims of political majorities did
not transgress the rights of individuals."' Indeed, it was the common law's distinction between legal rights and political ones that
characterized its solicitude for private property and civil liberties
and its insistence upon the equal operation of the law."17 As HobT

128. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 79-80.

129. Id. at 208, 213-14.
130. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
131. See, e.g., Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 628, 648; Fletcher,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138. See also Nedelsky, supra note 10, at 187-99.
132. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

133. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 628, 648; HOBSON, supra
note 7, at 91-95.
134. See Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty:
Constitutional Conservatismand the Problem of Factions 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. (Winter 1997) (forthcoming) (pp. 8-12) (manuscript on file with
author); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
ConstitutionalTradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58-61 (1991).
135. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 42-43.
136. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the federal judiciary as the "least dangerous branch").
137. See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 184-211.
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son notes, by the end of the eighteenth century jurists in Virginia
and other states began to review state laws to ensure that the political branches of government observed the limits of their authority. Judicial review, therefore, necessitated that judges exercise
the discretion afforded them in common law adjudication to preserve the will of the people as manifested in the provisions of state
constitutions. 8 Marshall and the other members of his Court accordingly understood judicial review as a by-product of popular
sovereignty and their tribunal as the guardian of the Constitution.
Hobson's main premise is that Marshall invoked judicial review cautiously, constrained by the conventions of the common law
and cognizant of the limits of federal judicial power. As a common
law jurist, Marshall construed the Constitution as a special kind of
statute, 139 aware that his principal objective was to interpret it as
the fundamental law of the nation and not from the short term
perspective of political expediency. Accordingly, Hobson argues
that Marshall exercised his interpretative discretion in an exceedingly careful manner. Rather than proclaim the unqualified supremacy of the federal judiciary, Marshall assiduously asserted its
independence to review the constitutionality of state and federal
laws. 140
In large part, Marshall's constitutional decisions support this
conception of judicial review. For example, in Marbury v. Madison,' Marshall articulated the common law distinction between
the judicial function and those of the political branches of government when he remarked: "The province of the court is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions
in their nature political.., can never be made
" 14 2
in this court.
Consequently, Marshall refused to sanction the exercise of
judicial review in disputes that primarily involved matters of for138. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 34-45. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 454-63 (Norton ed. 1972). See also

Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 VA. Cases 20 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1793) (declaring unconstitutional a 1792 act that authorized district court judges to exercise broad injunctive powers not granted to them by the Virginia constitution); Case of the
Judges, 4 Call. 142, 146 (Va. Ct. App. 1788) (distinguishing between the state

constitution as an act of the people and a statute and suggesting that judges
have the discretion to review the constitutionality of the latter consistent with
the notion of popular sovereignty); Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call. 5 (Va. Ct.
App. 1782) (dicta by Judge Wythe that the court could review the constitutionality of state laws).
139. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 199-200.

140. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
141. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

142. Id. at 170.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[31:137

eign"' or military policy. 1" For this reason Hobson believes that
Marshall's willingness to limn the boundaries of federal judicial
power indicates his restraint as Chief Justice. As further support
for this point Hobson cites Marshall's reluctance to embroil the
court in disputes over slavery and Indian affairs, even though he
personally opposed the institution of slavery and sympathized with
the plight of Indians. 4'
One decision that might appear to contradict Hobson's thesis
is McCulloch v. Maryland,"'since Marshall's opinion for the Court
broadly construed the Necessary and Proper Clause in sustaining
the constitutionality of the United States Bank and ignited considerable political controversy. However, as Hobson suggests, Marshall interpreted this constitutional provision as he would a statute, and used his reasonable discretion as a judge to conclude that
nothing in the Constitution precluded the federal government from
implementing its enumerated powers through implied means. 47
Considered from this perspective, Marshall's sweeping statements
in McCulloch about the need for flexible constitutional interpreta"
tion 48
' reflected his affinity for the common law and its emphasis
upon judicial pragmatism rather than a conscious attempt to expand the scope of federal authority at the expense of individual
states. In addition, Hobson argues that Marshall deferred to Congress when he refused to scrutinize the actual necessity of a federal bank and thus prevented the Court from engaging in a political question."9 Hobson regards this as a quintessential example of
Marshall's judicial restraint.
Hobson further contends that in McCulloch and other decisions pertaining to federalism, Marshall employed judicial review
defensively to preserve the national union from the excesses of

143. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812) (ruling a foreign affairs issue was non-justiciable); United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) (holding questions of foreign
policy non-justiciable).
144. See, e.g., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) (holding war
powers non-justiciable); cf Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. ( 2 Cranch) 170 (1804)
(invalidating a Presidential order to capture a ship sailing from a French
port).
145. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 164 -80 (discussing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66 (1825) (international slave trading dispute); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (Indian affairs); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (Indian affairs); and Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823) (Indian affairs)).
146. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
147. Id. at 406-23; HOBSON, supra note 7, at 122-24.
148. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (stating "[W]e must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding," and explaining that the Court
should exercise broad discretion in construing Congress' enumerated powers
under the Constitution).
149. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 160.
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state sovereignty. 5 ° His principal objective was to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution,' which allocated authority between the states and the federal government, and not to augment
national power through the guise of judicial review by striking
down state laws. In this regard, Hobson notes that Marshall was
especially critical of states' rights jurists who, he believed, unduly
restricted the scope of federal legislative and judicial authority in
ways inconsistent with the plain meaning and structure of the
Constitution.152 Thus, Marshall and the other justices readily sustained federal court jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws,"' or the nation's treaties, and, in particular,
insisted the Supreme Court's authority to review the constitutionality of state laws was an essential component of the federal
system. 1
Similarly, Hobson attributes Marshall's caution in cases involving interstate commerce and bankruptcy to judicial restraint.
He notes that in Gibbons v. Ogden," for example, the Chief Justice refused to interpret the Commerce Clause as conferring an
exclusive power upon the federal government to regulate commerce among the states because neither the precise language of
the Constitution nor its internal structure indicated the existence
of such broad authority. 57 However, Marshall did not go so far as
to rule that New York had concurrent power over interstate commerce. Instead, he simply held that because the New York steamboat licensing law conflicted with a federal act, constitutional supremacy required the Court to invalidate the local measure in
order to prevent the state from infringing upon national power."
Hobson suggests that Marshall's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause was deliberately ambiguous to keep the Court from involving itself in political disputes with states over whether their actions comprised legitimate police power regulations or impermissible attempts to restrict interstate commerce. S
150. Id. at 21, 24, 69, 122-23, 148, 210-11.
151. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat. ) at 403-06, 432-34.
152. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 200, 205-06. See also GUNTHER, supra note

79, at 155- 214 (containing copies of Marshall's essays in defense of the Constitution and federal judicial review published in 1819 in the Alexandria Gazette).
153. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. ( 9 Wheat.) 738
(1824).
154. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
155. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Marshall cogently expressed
his own extra-judicial views in a series of essays defending the Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See GUNTHER, supra note 79, at 155-214.
156. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
157. Id. at 186-220. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 142-47.
158. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 205-22.
159. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 145-47.
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Likewise, Marshall doubted that the federal government had
exclusive authority to regulate bankruptcy. Once the Court held
as such, Marshall apparently feared that it would confront semantical distinctions between state bankruptcy laws and insolvency
measures.16 These were, in essence, political questions beyond the
scope of federal judicial review.
Curiously, Hobson does not further develop this point in reference to Marshall's Contract Clause jurisprudence. Although, in
some respects, Marshall acknowledged differences between contract rights and remedies, he refused to believe such distinctions
diminished the scope of the Contract Clause as an absolute prohibition upon state police powers that impaired the obligation of contracts.' While Hobson briefly contrasts Marshall's rigid interpretation of the Contract Clause with his pragmatic analysis of the
Commerce and Bankruptcy Clauses,' he should clarify that in all
these areas of law Marshall declined to distort the meaning of the
Constitution because he intended to insulate the Court from the
external pressure of partisan politics.
Indeed, it was Marshall's efforts in this regard that belie Hobson's repeated assertion that Marshall's jurisprudence categorically distinguished between law and politics. For in proclaiming
the authority of federal courts to decide issues of law and in articulating the limits of judicial power, Marshall actually demonstrated
shrewd political instincts which enhanced the prestige of the federal judiciary and strengthened its constitutional role. 10 In part,
160. See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 194-96
(1819).

161. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 336-56 (1827)
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting).

162. The Bankruptcy Clause provides that Congress shall have the power
"To establish... uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. The Commerce Clause provides:
"The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " Id. at
cl. 3. In contrast to the Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause absolutely
prohibits specific state action. It exists to protect private contract rights from
state interference and does not, on its face, involve the delicate balance between state and federal authority. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 45, 75. See
Olken, Contract Clause Jurisprudence,supra note 92, at 513-16 (arguing that

nineteenth and early twentieth century Contract Clause jurisprudence reveals
divergent views of federalism), for a different view of judicial review and the
Contract Clause.
163. In essence, the Marshall Court's choice to refrain from deciding certain
cases actually may have increased its institutional legitimacy from the perspective of separation of powers. In this regard, Marshall's superb leadership
skills and political acumen undoubtedly were largely responsible for the
Court's emerging role as the prime guardian of constitutional values and liberties. Smith, unlike Hobson, emphasizes the political facets of Marshall's
tenure as Chief Justice. SMITH, supra note 1, at 19-20. See Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
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Hobson recognizes this,' but his analysis of Marshall's work on
the Court ignores the way in which the Chief Justice sometimes
manipulated the law through seemingly neutral constitutional interpretation to achieve a certain result.'"
Nowhere is this more clear than in Marbury v. Madison,'"
where Marshall ruled the Court lacked original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus, yet used this opportunity to articulate
the Court's authority to review the constitutionality of federal
laws. Hobson, unlike Smith, at least recognizes this odd characteristic of Marshall's decision, and cryptically suggests that had the
Court dismissed the case, it would have implicitly participated in
the partisan politics that surrounded Marbury's claim. 1 7 However,
one could argue that by hearing a dispute over which it had no jurisdiction, the Marshall Court involved itself in a political controversy in order to declare its constitutional power of judicial review.
Considered from this perspective, Marshall's interpretation of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and of Article III of the Constitution
raises doubts about the motives Hobson imputes for him. The
relevant language of the federal statute was ambiguous and conceivably constitutional under an alternative construction which
Marshall blithely ignored.'" In addition, Marshall, in dicta, erroers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983), for discussion of the connection between justiciability and separation of powers
164. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 49-51.
165. Hobson also does not really consider how Marshall's non-partisan political skills influenced the development of the Court's justiciability doctrine
during the early nineteenth century. Through a series of self-imposed restraints upon federal judicial authority, the Marshall Court further legitimized those instances when federal courts actually decided cases. Marshall
was undoubtedly perceptive enough to realize that by declaring the limits of
federal judicial power his Court was actually solidifying the independence of
the federal judiciary. Interestingly, Jean Edward Smith's biography of Marshall recognizes this facet of Marshall's judicial career whereas Hobson may
not.
166. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
167. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 54.
168. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided in relevant part:
The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after
specially provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition
to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the
principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789). Given the statute's ambiguous juxtaposition of terms,
one could argue that its provision for mandamus was not meant to modify the
Court's original jurisdiction, but rather its appellate jurisdiction, which Congress can certainly do pursuant to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 2. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 66, at 14-16. However, Marshall
still was correct in finding that the matter before the Court was one concerning its original jurisdiction. In this sense, his conclusion that Congress could
not alter the Court's original jurisdiction is correct, but nevertheless his gra-
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neously implied that Congress could not modify the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 6 ' Both of these aspects of Marbury imply that
notwithstanding Marshall's concerns about separation of powers,
he relished the chance to apply the doctrine of judicial review to
federal law. Ostensibly, Marshall may have sought to insulate the
Court from partisan politics through his emphasis upon the rule of
law as the basis of his decision. Yet, in this and other cases involving federal court jurisdiction, his interests in preserving federal
judicial review and the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme
Court were quite strong and probably influenced his tactics.
Hobson contends that although Marshall may have realized
the political and economic effects of his Court decisions, his primary intent was to separate law from politics in Supreme Court
adjudication. He further argues that Marshall could hardly anticipate in 1803 the extent to which judicial review would affect
political controversies. 170 While on the whole there is considerable
merit in these assertions, the distinction between legal and political issues in American constitutional law is not all that clear. Indeed, the Constitution itself is not only a legal document but also a
political one that prescribes a guideline for government. 7 ' It emanated from widespread political and economic dissatisfaction in
post-Revolutionary America that threatened the legal system. The
constitutional framers implicitly recognized that in a democratic
republic law reflects notions of politics, and they created a nation
in which there are both political and legal limits to governmental
authority.
Although the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land,
it embodies political assumptions that permeate its provisions.1
tuitous remarks about congressional regulation of the Court's appellate jurisdiction are not.
169. Marshall said:
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature
may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so
far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court
by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and
that in [all] others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import
of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is
original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175. Notice that Marshall omits reference in
this passage to Congress' power to regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
The actual constitutional language is "[iln all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See Van Alstyne, supra note 66,
at 30-33, for a discussion of this constitutional error by Marshall.
170. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 70.

171. SMITH, supra note 1, at 2. "Constitutions are political documents.
They define the way a nation is governed." Id.
172. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison) (discussing the
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As a result, constitutional interpretation invariably requires
judges to assess issues of law that often have political ramifications."' To imply, as Hobson does, that the rule of law in a constitutional democracy is entirely distinct from politics is therefore
somewhat inaccurate and misleading.
Marshall, no doubt, would have agreed with the early nineteenth century observation of Alexis de Tocqueville that "[s]carcely
any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."174 As an attorney
in Virginia and throughout his public career prior to coming onto
the Supreme Court, Marshall observed first hand the interplay between law and politics. One problem with Hobson's appraisal of
Marshall's jurisprudence is that it overstates the distinction between law and politics and presents the rule of law as an abstract
concept devoid of its political context. While Marshall emphasized
the rule of law in judicial decisionmaking, he never altogether ignored the political basis75 of law nor kept his political instincts at
bay while on the Court.
Indeed, when Marshall invoked the rule of law to protect
property rights from the ephemeral whims of democratic majorities, he implicitly articulated certain political values. 176 Similarly,
when he declared the supremacy of the Constitution to preserve
the delicate balance between state and federal authority he legitimized, through the course of judicial review, a particular set of
assumptions.'77 That Marshall's views may have represented a
consensus, as Hobson suggests, 7 8 should not obscure the notion
Constitution in the context of political factions, private rights and the tyranny
of the majority; and discussing constitutional democracy, political factions and
the separation of powers). See also NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 1-8, 141-84,
203-11, 261-64.
173. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 70 (discussing
judicial review), 348-58 (1987) (discussing constitutional adjudication and
public policy).
174. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Knopf reprint.
ed. 1972) (1835).
175. See WHITE, supra note 99, at 155, 163-80 (discussing the discretionary
aspects of the Marshall Court's appellate procedure as evidence of the interrelationship between law and politics). White further explains that Marshall
Court Justices differentiated partisan politics, from which they sought to insulate the Court, from ordinary politics and political ideas, which they recognized as intertwined with the law. Id. at 196-97. "Marshall Court Justices
sought to claim political power by demonstrating their apparent avoidance of
partisanship." Id. at 200.
176. See, e.g., NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 187-99 (discussing judicial review and the constitutional framers' emphasis upon private property).
177. In essence, Marshall's federalism decisions struck a blow at states'
rights in that they rejected the compact theory of government and reiterated
the notion that popular sovereignty was the basis for the union and of constitutional supremacy. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222
(1827); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403-06, 425-37 (1819).
178. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 206-07.
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that the rule of law as applied by courts reflects the symbiotic relationship between law and politics in a democratic society. In the
early nineteenth century John Marshall probably understood this
concept better than anyone, and although in many respects his
judicial opinions separated law from politics, they also melded
them in subtle ways.
CONCLUSION

The legacy of Marshall as Chief Justice was to legitimize judicial review in a democratic republic and to preserve the Court's
preeminent role in constitutional interpretation. For these reasons, he remains a figure of enormous importance in American
constitutional law. Both Jean Edward Smith and Charles F. Hobson provide, in complementary studies, fresh perspectives on the
life and jurisprudence of John Marshall that contribute significantly to understanding Marshall's place in history.

